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IMPLEMENTATION OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY BY THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS THROUGH THE POWER TO ACT IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: TWO DIVERGENT VIEWS
Extensive federal legislation aimed at achieving equal employment opportunity for all' manifests a commitment by the federal government to
eradicate employment discrimination based upon race, religion, sex, national origin, or, to some extent, age. Yet serious questions remain
concerning the proper method by which to achieve this result. One
important area of inquiry illustrated by the recent decision of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People v. FederalPower Connnission,2
concerns the role to be accorded independent regulatory agencies in the
pursuit of equal employment opportunity. Administrative agencies, such
as independent regulatory commissions, "are primarily instruments of
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers designed to carry- out policies
which reflect a broad consensus of public acceptance and approval." 3
Delegations of authority by the legislature often are cast in broad and
nebulous terms to provide the agency with sufficient flexibility and latitude to meet new situations. A common legislative mandate is that the
agency act in the "public interest" or for the "public convenience and
necessity. "4 Such language allows the agency the necessary discretion
1. The most comprehensive legislation in the area is found in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II 1972). In addition, there are several statutes that either specifically apply to
employment discrimination or have been interpreted to apply. E.g., Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1970); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §9 621-34
(1970); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970). Federal
jurisdiction is not exclusive in the area of employment discrimination and many states
have enacted statutes similar to Title VII. See generally FAIR EMP. PRAC. VAN. BNA
451:25-28 (1975).
2. 4 MB FED. POVER SERV. 6-48 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W.
3223 (Oct. 14, 1975).
3 Jones, The Role of Adininistrative Agencies as Instrmnents of Social Reform, 19
AD. L. REv. 279, 287 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (e) (1970) (CAB grants
certificates under such conditions as the public interest may require); Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970) (the presence of a national public
interest necessitates regulation of securities transactions).
[ 332 1

REGULATORY COMMISSION AUTHORITY

and power to expand the area of its operation to resolve and satisfy the
problems and needs continually arising from industrial expansion. Practical experience indicates that the agencies are "uniquely capable of redefining a public interest concept [and] regularly do so in the normal
course of their practice in order to keep pace with developments in the
regulated area." 5
Although discretionary power is necessary to the proper functioning
of an agency, such power also creates uncertainty as to the perimeters
within which the body is to operate. In determining the proper limits
of authority for an agency acting in the "public interest," three crucial
questions must be answered. First, how much responsibility can be given
to the agency without destroying its ability to perform efficiently the
function for which it was designed? Second, does the mere existence of
a clear national policy, such as equal employment opportunity, require
the "public interest" agencies to participate in the implementation of that
policy? Finally, even if the implementation of that policy is not required
by the "public interest" mandate, are the agencies constitutionally bound
to participate actively in the implementation of the policy because they
regulate in the area? Each of these questions was considered in NAACP
v. FPC; because of the importance of its issues and the potentially great
impact upon all regulatory commissions of the answers rendered,6 this
case serves as an appropriate vehicle for examining the proper extent of
the implementation of national policies, such as equal employment opportunity, by independent regulatory agencies.

NAACP v. FPC
Employment Discrimination:The Scope of Agency Regulation
Superficially, the positions of the litigants in NAACP were totally
adversary. The case was precipitated by the dismissal of a petition filed
with the FPC requesting the agency to promulgate a rule requiring its
5. Comment, Administrative Agencies, the Public Interest, and National Policy: Is a
Marriage Possible?, 59 Go. L.J. 420, 426 (1970). The Federal Communications Commission presents an excellent example of this principle in operation. The Commission
originally was created to regulate use of the electromagnetic spectrum, as chaos had
resulted from unrestricted access to the spectrum. Subsequently, the FCC constantly
has redefined the public interest to expand its scope of regulation to such matters as
scrutinizing the program content of its regulatees. See notes 137-142 infra.
6. Note that though the issues in NAACP v. FPC are significant, the concept of
regulation of employment practices is not entirely foreign to the independent regulatory scheme. The FCC has been regulating the employment practices of its licensees
since 1969. See note 104 infra & accompanying text.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:332

regulatees 7 to pursue equal opportunity and nondiscrimination practices."
The FPC ostensibly took the position, consistent with earlier pronounce-

ments,9 that due to the absence of explicit statutory authorization in

either the Federal Power Act 0 or the Natural Gas Act," it lacked the
jurisdiction to consider discrimination matters except with respect to the
supply of services or use of facilities.' 2 Moreover, the Commission as7. The agencies to be considered are the Federal Power Commission, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission. The Federal Trade Commission will not be discussed because it does not regulate any particular industry.
8. FPC Docket No. R-447 (1972). The proposed rule was similar to those adopted
by the FCC. See note 108 infra. It would permit the Commission to govern affirmative
programs, receive reports, and handle individual discrimination complaints. For the
full text of the proposed rule, see 4 MB FED. POWER SERV. at 6-71 to 6-76.
This was not the first nor the sole source of pressure on the FPC to adopt nondiscrimination rules and regulations. The EEOC, the Commission on Civil Rights, and the
Justice Department all favor FPC regulation of the employment practices of its regulatees as the utility industry is reported to have extremely low levels of minority employment. See Hearings on Responsibilities of the Federal Power Conmmission in the
Area of Civil Rights Before the Civil Rights Oversight Comnnittee of the House Corn7nittee on the judiciary, 92d Cong, 2d Sess., ser. 24, at 1-2 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings]. See also UNITED STATES CoMMISSION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGrS ENFORMENT EFFORT (1970) [hereinafter cited as REPORT-1970]; UNITED STATES
CoMMISSION

ON

CIVIL RIGHTS,

THE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A

REASSESSMENT

(1973) [hereinafter cited as REPoRT-1973].
9. Hearings, supra note 9 at 9, citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 44 F.P.C. 1373 (1970).
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-825r (1970) (sections 791-823 were formerly titled "The Federal Water Power Act").
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717(w) (1970).
12. The Natural Gas Act states in pertinent part:
No natural gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or sale
of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or
grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect,
either as between localities or as between classes of service.
15 U.S.C. 717c(b) (1970).
The Federal Power Act states in pertinent part:
No public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or sale subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference
or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice
or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as
between classes of service.
16 U.S.C. § 824(d)(b) (1970). See 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1970); 18 C.F.R. § 8.3 (1974) (requiring "equal and unobstructed" use of recreational facilities without regard to "race,
color, religious creed or national origin."); Hearing, supra note 9 at 3-12 (statement of
FPC Chairman Nassikas). In his statement before the Civil Rights Oversight Commit-
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serted that a close nexus did not exist between the purpose of the agency,
economic regulation, and the deleterious effects occasioned by the employment practices of the agency's regulatees. The agency further contended that consideration of discrimination in employment was not
warranted merely because of its "public interest" responsibilities. 3 In
considering these positions the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit became the first appellate court to review the refusal of
a regulatory commission to take jurisdiction of employment practice
regulation.
The court in NAACP, by noting that individuals could utilize commission proceedings to challenge increased utility costs arising from
discriminatory employment practices, found the positions of the adversaries less irreconcilable than they had appeared initially. 4 The court
stated that "a concession of this kind is not compatible with any flat statement that the Commission has no authority to consider.., employment
discrimination in its public interest determinations." 15 The question to
be answered, in the opinion of the court, was not whether the FPC had
any jurisdiction at all, but whether the agency could regulate employment practices per se, or merely as an ancillary consideration to its main
regulatory function. 6
The court found neither in the language -norin the legislative history
of the Federal Power Act 17 or the Natural Gas Act 8 (included within
the public interest authority of the Commission) the power to regulate
tee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, FPC Chairman Nassikas asserted that
the FPC did not have authority to engage in the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Instead, concluded Chairman Nassikas, the FPC's role was one of support and
cooperation with the EEOC and other agencies explicitly responsible for regulating
civil rights matters. Id. at 12.
13. In its opinion denying the petition, the Commission stated:
Application of a public interest concept in the context of any given regulatory statute presupposes inquiry into, and observance of, the legislative
purposes of that Act ....
[TIhe purposes of the National [Natural] Gas
and Federal Power Acts are economic regulation of entrepreneurs engaged
in resource development. So considered, we do not find the necessary nexus
between those aspects of our economic regulatory activities and the employment practices of the utility systems we regulate ....
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari S.Ct. Docket No. 74-1619 (June 20, 1975).
14. 4 MB FF.. PowR Saiv. at 6-52.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 6-53.
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-825r (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. 5 717-717(w) (1970).
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employment discrimination per se. ' 9 The Commission, stated the court,
therefore lacked the power to regulate employment discrimination solely
20
for the purpose of curtailing such conduct.
In so holding NAACP distinguished a past decision that recognized
that the policy of the antitrust laws was to be considered by the FPC
in its actions. 2' The petitioners had argued that consideration and implementation of antitrust policy by the agency formed a basis for similar
sensitivity to employment discrimination. In response, the court stated
that it is not true "that the context of the 'public interest' criterion is
generally supplied by other national policies and laws. Some such policies
and laws are surely relevant, but not simply because they exist. They
are relevant because their objectives 'can be related to the objectives of
the statute administered by the agency'." 22 Furthermore, the court
noted an express statutory basis in both the Federal Water Power Act
23
aqd the Natural Gas Act for the consideration of antitrust policies.
Similarly, the court rejected the contention that Commission consideration of environmental matters, as sanctioned in Udall v. FPC24 and

Scenic Hudson PreservationConference v. FPC,25 warranted a like consideration of employment discrimination under the "public interest"
standard. Udall and Scenic Hudson were distinguished on the point that
they involved the application of section 10(a) of the Federal Power
Act, 26 which expressly commands that projects adopted by the Commis19. The court found that under the "Federal Water Power Act", 16 U.S.C.
§ 791(a)-823 (1970) [now part of the Federal Power Act], the agency's public interest
authority existed to protect "the public's interest in the optimal use of the waterways."
4 AIB FED. POWER SERV. at 6-55. Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824-25r,
stated the court, this authority existed "to guard the consumer from exploitation by
non-competitive electric power companies." Id. at 6-56. As for the Natural Gas Act,
the court held that the public interest authority of the agency was created to stop
"exploitation of the gas consumer." Id. at 6-57.
20. 4 XIB FED. POWER SERV. at 6-58 to 6-61.
21. In Northern Natural Gas v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968) the court had
stated: "Although the Commission is not bound by the dictates of antitrust laws, it is
clear that antitrust concepts are intimately involved in a determination of what action
is in the public interest, and therefore the Commission is obliged to weigh antitrust
policy." 399 F.2d at 958 (citations omitted). See also California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482
(1962); City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
22. 4 MB FED. POWER SERV. at 6-61 (emphasis supplied by the court), quoting City
of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
23. 4 MB FED. POWER SERv. at 6-62. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(h) (1970) (FPA prohibition
of combinations in restraint of trade); 15 U.S.C. § 717(s) (a) (1970) (NGA requirement that the Commission notify the Attorney General of possible antitrust violations).
24. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
25. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970).
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sion "be the best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway . . . and for other beneficial public uses, including
recreational purposes." 27 Udall specifically involved the issue of whether
the FPC should consider, in receiving applications for the construction of
dams, the effects such dams would have on salmon spawning behavior.
The Supreme Court found that because salmon are sporting fish, their
protection bore a clear relation to the "recreational purposes" language
of the statute.2 8 Scenic Hudson decided that environmental effects were
an integral factor to be considered when choosing a plan "best adapted
to... improving or developing a waterway." - Moreover, the court in
NAACP noted that under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969," ° all federal agencies are required to consider the environmental
impact of any agency action."1
Although NAACP dismissed the contention that the FPC could regulate employment practices per se, it did provide at least a partial means
toward the goals petitioners sought. The court stated that it could "foresee situations in which consideration by the Commission of a regulatee's
discriminatory employment practices, including rules governing the
invocation of that consideration, reasonably could be related to the
pursuit of the Commission's proper objectives." 32 Although the court did
not delineate all of the forseeable situations, it did stress one example:
the potential adverse cost effects of discriminatory employment practices. 33
The court specifically ruled that section 9 of the proposed rule submitted by the petitioners, which provided that the Commission entertain
individual complaints, was inapplicable in view of the lack of jurisdiction
to regulate employment practices per se. The court, however, continued:
On the other hand, those sections providing for the annual filing
with the Commission of a form already due the EEOC (section 6),
and for intervention and receipt of evidence in Commission pro27. Id.
28. 387 U.S. at 437-40.

29. 354 F.2d at 612, quoting 16 U.S.C. § 803 (a) (1970).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).

31. Id. at § 4332 (2) (A)-(H).
32. 4 MB FED. POWER SERV. at 6-65.
33. Such costs could include, for example: duplicate labor costs resulting from back
pay awards in discrimination suits, costs incurred as a result of the loss of government
contracts, costs of legal proceedings arising out of discrimination charges, and the
cost of strikes due to discriminatory labor policies. Indeterminate costs could include,
for instance, those arising from inefficiency of minority employees created by low
morale. Id. at 6-65 to 6-66.
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ceedings (sections 10 and 11), might well be viewed as orderly
methods of bringing to the Commission's attention information
which could be relevant to its deliberations....a4
Section 11 of the proposed rule directs the Commission to give material
consideration to the information required to be provided under sections 4
through 7; significantly, these sections would seem to imply more than
a nominal involvement by the Commission. Section 4 allows the Commission to oversee equal employment opportunity programs required to
be instituted by regulatees, while section 5 delineates the substantive
requirements of such programs. Section 6 requires the regulatee to file
with the FPC a copy of the annual employment report required by the
EEOC. Section 7 requires that the regulatee attach equal employment
compliance information to every application for a license, renewal of a
license, rate change, certificate of public convenience and necessity, or
other Commission benefits." Although the court did not order the adoption of flhese proposals, its pointed suggestion can be expected to be persuasive on remand to the Commission.

CostitutionalIssues Raised by NAACP
Petitioners in NAACP posed an interesting constitutional argument
as a basis fog Commission regulation of employment practices. Reliance
was placed upon the doctrine of "state action," which, simply stated,
provides that "when a state has become a joint participant in a pattern
of . . . discriminatory conduct by placing itself in a position of interdependence with private individuals acting in such a manner ... this
constitutes a type of 'state action' proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 36 Further, petitioners cited precedent for their contention that
constitutional obligations of the Government devolve upon private individuals either endowed with "powers or functions governmental in
nature" or granted some governmental benefit.3 7 Specifically, they contended that the discriminatory activities of the FPC regulatees amounted
34. 4 MB FED. PowFR SERV. at 6-70 (the text of the proposed rule is found at 6-71
to 6-76).
35. ld.
36. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Ohio 1967). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The doctrine of state action is applicable to the federal government through the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
37. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), cited at 4 MB FED. PowER SEav. at 6-68
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to state action, thereby requiring FPC regulation of employment practices, because of: "(1) the ... comprehensive extent of federal regulation ...; (2) the enjoyment by the companies of what amounts to a
government-granted monopoly; and (3) their performance of a governmental function in the production and transmission of energy." s3
The court agreed that in certain circumstances the obligations of the
Government can be enforced against private individuals whose action
becomes "state action." Further, the court agreed that national policy
could require the termination of any ongoing relationship between the
39
Government and a private party involved in discriminatory practices.
The court did doubt, however, that there would be a constitutional obligation to regulate the individual to the extent of dictating the specific
act necessary to attain compliance.
In addition, NAACP noted the recent decision of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,4 0 in which the Supreme Court held that regulation,
in and of itself, does not involve the Government in the affairs of the
regulatee to such an extent as to result in state action even if the regulation "is extensive and detailed, as in the case of most public utilities .... ." "' To amount to state action, the Court continued, there must
be a "sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged activity of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as the action of the State itself." I
In determining whether such a nexus exists, the Court apparently
would ask whether the challenged act of the regulatee falls within the
scope of conduct that the agency was created to govern. The primary
inquiry, then, under such an approach, would examine the relationship
between the articulated regulatory function of any given agency and
the alleged discriminatory act of the regulatee. Utilizing such a test, an
activity of a regulatee might be state action if performed under the
38. 4 MB FED. POWER S-Rv. at 6-67.

39. Id. at 6-68 n.50. In support of this proposition the court cited McGlotten v.
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), in which the Secretary of the Treasury was
enjoined from extending tax benefits to fraternal and nonprofit organizations because
of their discriminatory membership practices. See also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Green v. Coit, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Ethridge v. Rhodes,
268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
40. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
41. Id. at 453.
42. Id. See also Martin v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1971).
"[Tlhe state must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution alleged
to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury." Id.
at 1118, quoting Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968).
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auspices of a regulatory agency sufficiently concerned with that type
of activity, while the same activity performed by another regulatee, if
governed by a commission removed from the close regulation of such
action, might not be state action.4 3 Under this premise, it can be argued
that FPC regulation of the employment practices of public utilities is
questionable, unlike FPC regulation of discriminatory area rate charges.
Notably, the court in NAACP did not examine the nice distinctions
inherent in the state action argument. Rather, invoking the principle that
constitutional issues will not be decided if they can be avoided, the court
dismissed the argument by stating that "however we might resolve our
difficulties with the proposition that the Commission is constitutionally
required to adopt some anti-discrimination rule, we are very sure that it
is not required to adopt this one." 44
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE REGULATION AND THE OTHER COMMISSIONS

The ultimate resolution of the issues presented in NAACP could have
a tremendous impact on the functioning and responsibilities of not only
the Federal Power Commission, but also other independent regulatory
agencies. Regulatory agencies have not been
oblivious to the
problem of equal employment opportunity, nortotally
have they been totally
insulated from pressure to undertake affirmative duties in this area. Each
agency, at least in public statements, has recognized the need to oversee
the employment practices of its regulatees. The current status of agency
conduct in this area, however, presents a varied picture of action and
inaction.

The Securities and Exchange Commission
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) was created by the Securities and Exchange Act of 193445 to regulate the securities industry
for the benefit and protection of investors and the general public. Although the securities laws are remedial in nature and are construed
broadly so that they may perform their function, the judiciary traditionally has observed that these are specialized statutes that are concerned
43. See notes 94-103 infra & accompanying text.
44. 4 MB FED. POWER S.RV. at 6-70. The court refused to detail the constitutional
obligations of the Commission, leaving the task to the Commission itself.
45. 15 U.S.C. §

78(a)-78(jj-1)

(1970). In addition to the Securities and Exchange

Act, which deals primarily with brokerages and secondary offerings of securities,
the SEC is charged with the administration of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
5S 77(a)-77(aa) (1970), which deals with initial issue and primary offerings.
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only with the economic aspects of the investment milieu.46 The SEC
has adopted this point of view in regard to employment discrimination.
In 1974, the SEC denied a petition that requested its regulatees to
demonstrate affirmatively the absence of discriminatory employment
practices.4 7 In so acting, the Commission reasoned that efforts to regulate
the employment practices of its regulatees merely would duplicate existing federal laws.48 Moreover, in rejecting the petition, the Commission
specifically noted that neither evidence of discriminatory employment
conduct nor evidence of an adverse impact on investors and capital markets as a result of alleged discriminatory conduct was produced. 49 In view
of the Commission's prior practice of considering only economic factors,
it is doubtful that the SEC, in pointing to the absence of a showing of
discriminatory conduct, meant to suggest that such a showing alone
would prompt the agency into action. It would appear, however, to be
entirely proper for the Commission to act upon a showing that discriminatory conduct has adversely affected an investor. Significantly, such
action, consistent with prior SEC pronouncements, would comport with
the cost factor analysis of NAACP.50
It therefore is evident that although a strict economic-oriented approach to SEC functions may appear to preclude Commission involvement with the employment practices of its regulatees, a contrary result
has obtained, albeit in a nominal and indirect fashion. Thus, since 1971,
the SEC has required "disclosure if material, of proceedings arising, for
example, under the Civil Rights Act, any debarment or other sanctions
imposed under Executive Order 11246, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and any sanctions imposed for violation of the non-discrimination rules of any Federal regulatory agency whenever such actions are
material." 5' Although uncertainty often may exist as to the materiality
46. See, e.g., Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1131 (S.D.N.Y

1973) (Congress never intended to expand the scope of the securities acts beyond the
commercial world to the realm of intangible personal values).
47. SEC Release No. 10597 (January 14, 1974), in 2 CCH Emss'. PRac. GUIDE
(1974).

5205

48. id. The SEC noted that securities exchange, NASD, and the firms that employ
the overwhelming majority of persons in the brokerage field would all be subject to
EEOC jurisdiction in matters dealing with employment discrimination. The SEC was
unpersuaded that the nonexclusive nature of the EEOC's jurisdiction warranted the
adoption of an SEC rule. Id. at 3386-3387.
49. Id. at 3386.

50. See note 33 supra &accompanying text.
51. SEC Release No. 9252 (July 19, 1971), in 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
80,488 (1971).

78,150 at
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of a proceeding, actions that would result in the cancellation of a government contract or termination of business relations with the Government,
apparently are deemed material unless the regulatee affirmatively demonstrates to the contrary. 2 In view of the impact that the loss of governmental business could have upon the financial structure of an enterprise,
and a fortiori upon the investor, the disclosure requirement appears to be
in complete harmony with the espoused purpose of the Commission and
the relevant legislation.53
The Civil Aeronautics Board
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), which is responsible for the
regulations of commercial air carriers under the Federal Aviation Act,54
responded in 1972 to pressure from the Civil Rights Commission by
issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the subject of
employment discrimination by the Board's regulatees55 In addition to
the possibility of regulating employment discrimination by virtue of the
Board's public interest responsibilities, the Notice suggested that sections
10256 and 404(b) 57 of the Federal Aviation Act mandate such regulation. 8
Section 404(b) prohibits the subjecting of any person "in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." " There is some
doubt, however, as to whether the provision is strictly service-oriented
or broad enough to encompass discriminatory employment practices.
Several factors militate against the broader reading of section 404(b).
First, as noted by the Board in its Advance Notice, the Supreme Court
held in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air52. Id.
53. See note 46 supra & accompanying text.
54. 49 U.S.C. S§ 1301-1542 (1970).
55. 37 Fed. Reg. 15518 (1972).

56. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
57. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
58. 37 Fed. Reg. 15518, 15519 (1972).
59. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970). The section reads in full:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port,
locality, or description of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic
in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
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lines, Inc.'4° that section 404(b) is a "familiar type of regulation, aimed

primarily at rate discrimination injurious to shippers, competitors, and
localities." 61 Second, it also has been held that employees are not included within the term "person... in air transportation." 62 Finally, the
potentiality of expanding the scope of section 404(b) is weakened by an
in pari materia reading with section 102 of the Aviation Act.6 3
60. 372 U.S. 714 (1963). Continental Airlines was precipitated by a finding of the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission that Continental had rejected a black job
applicant solely because of his race. Under the Colorado Discrimination Act of 1957,
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-6 (1963), the Commission issued a cease and desist
order. A state court dismissed the Commission's findings and the Supreme Court of
Colorado affirmed. 372 U.S. at 716-717.
Reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court of the United States held that federal
legislation and Executive Orders had not so pervasively covered the field of employment
discrimination as to preempt state legislation on the subject. The airlines had argued
that preemption resulted from section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
[forbidding air carriers to subject any particular person to "any unjust discrimination
or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever,"
49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970), quoted at 372 U.S. at 7231 and section 102 of that Act
[requiring "the promotion of adequate economical, and efficient service by air carriers
at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices

. . . ."

49 US.C. § 1302(c) (1970),

quoted at 372 U.S. at 723]. The Court rebutted the preemption argument by assuming
arguendo that these sections "protect job applicants or employees from discrimination
on account of race," 372 U.S. at 723. The Court noted that such an assumption did not
necessitate a conclusion of pre-emption. Significantly, the Court did imply that the
assumption may comport with reality, for it stated: "The Civil Aeronautics Board
and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency have indeed broad authority
over flight crews of air carriers, much of which has been exercised by regulations."
Id. (footnotes omitted). Discussion of this aspect of the case may be found at 37 Fed.
Reg. 15518, 15519 (1972).
61. 372 U.S. at 723. Although such language has been expanded to prohibit discrimination against passengers, such an interpretation is consonant with a service oriented
construction of section 404(b). See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960);
Mitchell v. United States, 313 US. 80 (1941).
62. 37 Fed. Reg. 15518-19 (1972).
63. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). The section states in pertinent part:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other things, as being in
the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and
necessity:
(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize
and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety
in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to
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Section 102 sets forth guidelines for determining the Board's "public
interest" standard, providing, inter alia, that the Board should consider:
"The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue
preferences or advantages or unfair or destructive competitive practices ....

4

The Board itself reasoned that the section's delineation of

the public interest standard, though somewhat broad in parts," restricts
the ability to infer nonservice-oriented responsibilities within the purview of section 404(b), or the general public interest standard. 8
As an additional explicit statutory mandate, the CAB referred to
section 401 (d) (3) of the Aviation Act, which requires that a carrier be
"fit" to perform its duties.8 7 Noting that "[r]egulatory agencies ... have
been upheld by the courts in denying applications for benefits filed by
law violators on the grounds of fitness," 68 the Board reasoned that any
violation of antidiscrimination statutes that adversely affected the rendition of services would be a proper matter for consideration. Although
stated in somewhat nebulous and broad terms, this position of the CAB
appears to be comparable to the NAACP cost factor analysis.
In considering whether the CAB could regulate employment discrimination per its public interest mandate, the Board stated that such regulation would have to be founded upon the purpose and policy guidelines
of section 102 of the Act, but the Board did not pursue this inquiry
further. Specifically, it left open the question of whether a basis for regulation could be found in the section 102 (a) policy of "encouragement
and development of an air transportation system." 69 The Board did note,
however, that since section 102 (f) mandates that it consider the "promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics" when it
improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air
carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices ...
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.
Id.
64. Id. § 1302(c).

65. See note 63 supra.
66. 37 Fed. Reg. 15518, 15519-20 (1972).
67. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (3)(1970).
68. 37 Fed. Reg. at 15520 (footnote omitted), citing Great Lakes v. CAB, 294 F.2d
217 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961).
69. 37 Fed. Reg. at 15520, citing 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1970). For the full text of
section 1302 (a), see note 63 supra.
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acts,7" and since the development of civil aeronautics should be consonant with other national policies, regulation of employment discrimination
is arguably within the purview of the agency's powers. 7' The Board next
diluted this position, though, by noting that Title VII was intended to
72
fulfill such purposes in the employment area.
Positing the alternatives upon which it could proceed, the Board concluded:
The nature of the Board's role, if any, will depend upon the source
of its jurisdiction. Thus, under one interpretation, the Board may
be empowered to regulate equal employment opportunity practices directly by rule or by conditioning awards of operating
authority. Under another interpretation, the Board may have no
direct regulatory authority, but nevertheless may consider employment practices as a factor in making determinations of public interest in exercising its delegated functions under the Federal
Aviation Act. Yet another interpretation would be that the Board
has no statutory authority in this area. 73
As should be noted, these are precisely the issues considered by the Court
in NAACP with respect to the FPC. Apparently, the CAB has been unable to choose affirmatively between the alternatives, as the proposed
rulemaking has been pending since 1972. Consequently, by indecision,
the third alternative presently governs.
The Interstate Commerce Commission
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), originally created by
the Interstate Commerce Act of 188971 to protect the public from commercial abuse practiced by the railroads, is now responsible for "developing, coordinating and preserving a national transportation system
by water, highway and rail ... adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States." 75Like the CAB, the ICC apparently has
been unable to determine whether the regulation of employment practices is appropriate for Commission consideration, for the matter has been
70. Id. § 1302(f).

71. 37 Fed. Reg. at 15521-2.
72. Id. In this regard, it should be noted that Congress rejected proposals that have
made the EEOC the exclusive enforcement agency for equal opportunity laws. See note
92 infra.
73. 37 Fed. Reg. at 15521.
74. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1970).
75. Id. (National Transportation Policy Note preceding section 1).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:332

pending since the issuance of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 197 1.71
Under the empowering provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
Commission's primary, if not sole responsibility, centers upon economic
considerations. For example, the ICC is responsible for ensuring just
and reasonable rates,77 rerouting traffic upon failure of the initial carrier
to serve the public if such rerouting is found to be "in the interest of the
public and the commerce of the people," 78 controlling the extension and
abandonment of lines based upon a showing of public convenience and
necessity,7 9 formulating reasonable rules, regulations and practices with

respect to car service, including the compensation to be paid.80 An arguable basis for jurisdiction over employment practices, however, has been
found in the 1940 amendment to the Act, which promulgates a National
Transportation Policy."'
The policy statement provides that the Commission should administer
the Act so as to "promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation . . . ; to
encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for
transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences
or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices .
*..." 82
83
Similar language exists in the Federal Aviation Act, which used the
Interstate Commerce Act as a model. However, the policy further requires that the Commission "encourage fair wages and equitable working
conditions" within the industry. 4 Similar language is not found in the
Federal Aviation Act, a fact noted by the CAB in concluding that, unlike the ICC, the CAB may not have the power to regulate employment
discrimination.85
76. 36 Fed. Reg. 10741 (June 1, 1971).
77. 49 U.S.C. 5 1(4) (1970).
78. Id. 5 1(16).

79. Id. 5 1(IS) & (20).
80. Id. § 1(14).
81. Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722 §§ 1-27, 54 Stat. 899, amending 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27,30127 (1934).

82. Id. (National Transportation Policy Note preceding section 1).
83. 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).

84. 49 U.S.C. at National Transportation Policy Note Preceding Section 1 (1970).
85. The CAB stated:
Congress has not laid down for the [CAB] any public interest standard
parallel to the provisions of the National Transportation Policy in the
Interstate Commerce Act... which declares the policy of Congress, among
other things, "to encourage . . . equitable working conditions" . . . and

directs that the Act is to be administered and enforced to carry out that
policy.
37 Fed. Reg. at 15521.
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There is some judicial support for the proposition that the ICC is empowered to consider national policies without the scope of its enabling
act. In ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Association8 6 the Supreme
Court held that the impact of the abandonment of a railway line on the
labor force was a matter to be considered by the ICC in its determination
of the "public convenience and necessity." The Court stated:
[f national interests are to be considered in connection with an
abandonment, there is nothing in the Act to indicate that the national interest in purely financial stability is to be determinative
while the national interest in the stability of the labor supply available to the railroads is to be disregarded.87
It must be noted, however, that the situation in Railway Labor was one
that required direct, affirmative action on the part of the ICC in approving an abandonment. 8 Limited by its facts, it is doubtful that the holding
applies to discriminatory employment practices arising from the ordinary
course of business and not requiring ICC approbation. The act of hiring
or firing, for example, therefore would seem to be beyond the reach of
Railway Labor.
Other cases have considered whether the federal antitrust laws preclude the enforcement by the ICC of antitrust policies in the "public
interest." In McLean Truckiig Co. v. United States,s9 for example, the
Supreme Court considered whether the ICC's authority to approve industry consolidations should be affected by the antitrust laws notwithstanding a provision in the Sherman Act 0 exempting from coverage
86. 315 U.S. 373 (1942).
87. Id. at 377.
88. Under the facts of the case, the advent of motor coach passenger service precipitated the abandonment of railway lines, with a resultant termination of particular
railroad employees. Under 49 U.S.C. § 1(18)-(20) (1970), any carrier must obtain from
the Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity before a railway line
lawfully may be abandoned. In addition, the Commission "may attach to the issuance
of the certificate such terms and conditions as in its judgment the public convenience
and necessity may require." 49 U.S.C. § 1(20) (1970). Representatives of the railroad
employees contended that the certificate should be granted only upon certain conditions designed to protect the employees. 315 U.S. at 374. The Court held that the utilization of such conditions was within the Commission's authority, but left the final
decision to the ICC. Id. at 380.
89. 321 U.S. 67 (1944). McLean Trucking involved an appeal to set aside certain
ICC orders that authorized the consolidation of seven large motor carriers. The consolidation created the largest single motor carrier in the United States. Id. at 68-72.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal
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transactions authorized by the ICC. The Court decided that the Commission's authority to approve mergers, acquisitions, and the like was not
plenary; rather, it "is restricted ... by all the ramifications of the antitrust laws and policies, to which the Commission must give strict regard
in approving motor consolidations, as if the exemption did not exist." 91
In reaching this decision the Court, reflecting on the propriety of incorporating national policy considerations into an internally developed
standard, stated:
[I]n executing those [immediate regulatory] policies the Commission may be faced with overlapping and at times inconsistent
policies embodied in other legislation enacted at different times and
with different problems in view. When this is true, it cannot without more ignore the latter. The precise adjustments which it must
make, however, will vary from instance to instance depending on
the extent to which Congress indicates a desire to have those policies leavened or implemented in the enforcement of the various
specific provisions of the legislation with which the Commission
92
is primarily and directly concerned.
Such an ad hoc approach necessarily creates an uncertainty as to the
propriety of agency actions that do not comport with policies embodied
in legislation lying outside the agency's enabling statute. In examining
the propriety of agency conduct, the court is to focus upon the act in
question as related to the purpose for which the agency was created. In
so doing, the public interest responsibilities of the agency are thereby
Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission ....
91. 321 U.S. at 78.
92. Id. at 80 (dictum) (citations omitted). It should be noted that past attempts
to make the EEOC the exclusive enforcement agency of equal opportunity employment have failed. 110 CONG. REC. 13650-52 (1964) (proposed amendment to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by Senator Taft); Hearings, supra note 8, at 35-36, 61-65.
Further, one commentator has noted:
Congress had ample opportunity at the time it was considering Title VII
to know that the NLRB had already launched its attack on employers and
unions which practice racial discrimination. It is arguable that congressional failure to provide an exclusive federal remedy through the EEOC
constitutes inferential approval of the NLRB activity. If Congress approved
past NLRB activity and allowed its continuation, it could not logically
have intended to prevent other federal agencies from entering the field in
the future where such entrance is based on an agency's statutory authority.
Note, The FCC's Role in Providing Equal Employment Opportunity for Minority
Groups, 53 B.U.,. RFv. 657, 680 (1973) (footnotes omitted).

1975]

REGULATORY COMMISSION AUTHORITY

practically delimited. Regarding the scope of the ICC's "public interest"
responsibilities in particular, the Supreme Court has stated:
[T] he term 'public interest' ..

.

is not a concept without ascertain-

able criteria, but has direct relation to adequacy of transportation
service, to its essential conditions of economy and efficiency, and
to appropriate provision and best use of transportation facilities,
questions to which the Interstate Commerce Commission has con93
stantly addressed itself in the exercise of authority conferred.

Arguably, through utilization of a state action argument an affirmative
duty may be imposed on the ICC to enter the employment regulation
area. The Interstate Commerce Act provides that the Commission may
place conditions on mergers, and mandates that the ICC "require a fair
and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected." 14 To understand the significance of this provision,
the unique characteristics of the discrimination problem within the railway industry first must be considered.
The railroad employment structure is based upon a strict craft and
class seniority system. It was not unusual for pre-Title VII employment
contracts to provide for the exclusion of minorities, particularly blacks,
from the more desirable crafts. Although such contracts could not, and
did not, survive the remedial impact of Title VII, the effects of this discrimination have not been eliminated. Post-Title VII contracts still may
operate so as to perpetuate discriminatory employment practices. 5 Although minority group members now may enter the more desirable
crafts, the seniority system threatens their job security. Following a
merger, for instance, resultant reduction of the work force finds a disproportionate number of minority employees displaced as a result of the
"last hired first fired" practice. At least one court, holding this result to
be violative of Title VII, required affirmative action by the employer to
correct the discrimination. 6 Further, when a minority group member
93. New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932). Cf. Alabama

Elec. Coop. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1965): 'vVords like 'public interest' . . take their meaning and definition from the substantive provisions and purposes of the
Act." Id. at 907.
94. 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (1970).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 415 F.2d 418, 448 (5th Cit.
1971).

96. Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974)
(liability); 8 BNA FEP Cases 729 (E.D. La. 1974) (remedy).
Watkins involved a class action challenging layoff and recall practices that were
based on seniority. The plaintiffs argued that the utilization of seniority as a basis for
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has managed to obtain seniority in one craft, transfer to another craft
leads to the total loss of seniority. 9 7 Notably, the above results are perpetuated by contracts that, though neutral on their face, retain a craft
and seniority system that sustain at least the vestiges of past discriminatory
conduct.
With regard to the discriminatory effects of mergers, the state action
argument finds some support in the Supreme Court decision, Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 8 which involved the granting of a state liquor
license. The regulations pursuant to which the license was issued required that "[e]very club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of
its Constitution and By-laws." " The constitution of the Moose Lodge,
in turn, authorized discriminatory conduct.
The Supreme Court noted that the impetus for the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the state if it is state action that enforces
privately organized discrimination. Although the Court found that the issuance of the license in itself did not constitute state action, it found that
the regulations invoked the sanctions of the state to enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule. In so holding, the Court recognized that
"[s]tate action for purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, may emanate
from rulings of administrative and regulatory agencies as well as from
legislation or judicial action." 10 Even though the Liquor Control Board
regulation was neutral in its terms, the Court found that the result of its
application amounted to state action.
Such a rationale is relevant to the above discussion of the deleterious
effects that mergers have on minority group employees when it is noted
that the Commission is required, for a specified period, to maintain the
rights of the employees gained through earlier collective bargaining
layoffs was racially discriminatory because blacks had been prevented from acquiring
seniority because of the employer's previous all-white hiring policy. Id. at 1224. The
district court noted that the employer's intent was not a relevant consideration. Id. at
1224 n.3. The court held that employment preference could not be allocated on the
basis of length of service and that existing practices should be altered so as to redress
the discrimination. Contra, Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Mar. 13, 1975) (No. 74-1064).
See generally Levitt, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: A Review of Significant Decisions, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 529, 530-35 (1975).
97. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1971).
98. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
99. Id. at 177, quoting regulations of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, § 113.09
(June 1970 ed.).
100. 407 U.S. at 179 (citations omitted).
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agreements.' 0 ' As the effect of these agreements arguably perpetuates past
discriminatory practices, 102 requiring the ICC to enforce such agreements
would seem to fall squarely within the rationale of Moose Lodge.
Acceptance of the state action argument next poses the question as to
what action would be required of the ICC. In Moose Lodge, the license
under review was not revoked, apparently because state regulation of
liquor through the use of licenses was not deemed to amount to a state
granted monopoly. 0 3 Because railroad labor unions are the exclusive
bargaining agents for railway employees, a different result, requiring
affirmative action by the ICC to eliminate all vestiges of past discrimination, may obtain.
The FederalCommnications Commission
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted rules proscribing employment discrimination in 1969,104 and thereby became the
first and only agency to implement formal rules regarding employment
practices. 105 Although the FCC entertained several theoretical grounds
for assuming jurisdiction over employment practices, 0 6 the Commission
101. 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (r) (1970). The section reads in pertinent part:
In its order of approval the Commission shall include terms and conditions
providing that during the period of four years from the effective date of
such order such transaction will not result in employees of the carrier or
carriers by railroad affected by such order being in a worse position with
respect to their employment, except that the protection afforded to any employee pursuant to this sentence shall not be required to continue for a longer
period ...

than the period during which the employ of such carrier

...

prior to the effective date of such order.
Id. For a discussion of the legislative history and purpose of this section, see Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 339 U.S. 142 (1950).
102. See note 96 supra & accompanying text.
103. Justice Douglas dissented on this point. In his opinion there was a state-granted
monopoly, thereby requiring revocation. 407 U.S. at 182 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 18 F.C.C.2d
240 (1969).
105. The rules were implemented as a result of petitioning by the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ. The FCC apparently was persuaded by the
holding of Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966), that petitioners had standing to challenge a license renewal on the
grounds that discriminatory programming was inimical to the public interest.
106. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the Commission placed emphasis on the
relationship between violation of the laws (such as Title VII) and the public interest.
13 F.C.C.2d 766, 767, 769 (1968). Case law supported this position. See, e.g., Mansfield
Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 -(D.C. Cir. 1950) (violation of antitrust laws may be considered by the Commission in determining whether granting a license would be in the
public interest).
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finally relied on its own concept of the "public interest" standard. Believing that without minority representation there would be no accurate
input of minority views and no internal impetus to develop programming
that would satisfy the needs of minority audiences, the agency deemed
equal opportunity employment a condition precedent to quality broad07
casting.'
The rules promulgated by the FCC require broadcasters 0 8 to take

affirmative steps guaranteeing the establishment of fair employment practices with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 10' The
Report and Order adopting the rules provided the general standard to be

applied by the Commission in considering discrimination matters:
"[W]hile not every complaint of an isolated action, even if substantial,

will warrant deferring a renewal or designating a renewal application
for [an evidentiary] hearing, renewal will not be appropriate where there
is a pattern of substantial failure to accord equal employment opportunities."

110

Less than a year later, the Commission ordered all licensees

subject to the regulations to file annual employment reports outlining the
results of their affirmative programs.' The Commission, however,
initially made limited use of these reports; rather than examining the types
of positions given minority groups by the licensee, 12 or equating the
licensee's employment of less than a representative number of minority

group members with employment discrimination,

13

the Commission

107. 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969).
108. The original broadcasters covered were commercial or noncommercial standard,
FA, television, and international licensees. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.125, 73.301, 73.599, 73.680,
73.793 (1974). Subsequently this was expanded to include common carrier licensees,
47 C.F.R. 5 21.307 (1974), and cable licensees and permittees of cable television relay
stations, 47 C.F.R. § 76.311 (1974).
109. The requirements focused on duties of management, contact with sources of
minority applicants, and positive recruitment programs. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.125, 73.301,
73.599, 73.680, 73.793 (1974). Sex was added as an unlawful basis for discrimination in
1971. Equal Employment Program, 32 F.C.C.2d 708 (1971).
110. 18 F.C.C.2d at 241-42 (footnotes omitted).
111. Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 23 F.C.C.2d
430 (1970).
112. See Equal Employment Opportunity Inquiry, 36 F.C.C.2d 515, 518 (1972) (opinion of Commissioner Johnson).
113. 'Ve have at no time indicated that fully proportional employment of minority
groups is called for by our rules, since we do not believe that fair employment practices will necessarily result in the employment of any minority group in direct proportion to its numbers in the community." 23 F.C.C.2d at 431. This policy, though not
actually overruled, was greatly affected by later appellate review of renewal challenges,
in which the courts stated that statistical disproportion could play an important role
in establishing a prima facie violation of the regulations. See notes 123-130 infra &
accompanying text.
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policed only those licensees employing no blacks or women, or whose
employment of these groups actually declined from the previous
period." 4 Even this minimal perusal appears to have been neglected on
occasion." 5 The Commission, however, did consider several cases in
which, aside from an individual complaint or a lack of proportionate
minority representation, there existed additional factors that raised
serious compliance questions." 6
In summary, early operation of the rules generally resulted in rare
Commission denials of license or renewal applications. Petitioners challenging license renewals were usually unsuccessful in obtaining even an
evidentiary hearing on an employment discrimination charge." 7 Perhaps
114. Equal Employment Opportunity Inquiry, 36 F.C.C.2d 515, 518 (1972) (opinion of
Commissioner Johnson). The agency adamantly refused to conduct evidentiary hearings
on employment discrimination when .presented solely with statistical evidence that minority group members were represented disproportionately in the employment force of
a licensee. See, e.g., Time-Life Broadcast, Inc., 33 F.C.C.2d 1050, 1059 (1972); Pueblo
Stereo Broadcasting Corp., 32 F.C.C.2d 734, 737 (1971); WTAR Radio-TV Corp., 31
F.C.C.2d 812, 833 (1970). Commissioner Johnson typically dissented from the conviction with which the Commission cast aside the statistical question. "A station's equal
employment program, no matter how elaborate it may be on paper, cannot count for
much unless and until hiring of racial minorities bears some reasonable relationship to
the minorities' composition of the area's population." WGN of Colorado, Inc., 31
F.C.C.2d 413, 423 (1971).
115. See Great Trails Broadcasting Corp., 39 F.C.C.2d 39, 47 (1972) (dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Johnson).
116. In one such case, Bob Jones Univ. Radio Station NMUU, 25 F.C.C.2d 732 (1970),
the Commission reviewed the license of a university-operated radio station that employed only students, faculty and their spouses, and alumni. The Commission noted the
complete absence of an equal opportunity employment program and was particularly
critical "of the fact that the station utilize[d] as a primary source of recruitment a
school which [did] not accept [blacks]." Id. at 734. An affirmative action program was
ordered. See also Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 33 F.C.C.2d 495 (1972) (charge
that station employed no blacks); Kings Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 339 (1972), aff'd,
498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (religious affiliation is a valid nondiscriminatory requirement only for religiously oriented operations).
Moreover, the mere existence of formal rules probably resulted in voluntary compliance that might .not have occurred otherwise. Sensitivity to the rules is illustrated by
the fact that broadcast complaints charging employment discrimination rose from 29 in
fiscal 1970 (race category only) to 165 in fiscal 1971 (all categories) and 202 in fiscal
1972 (all categories). FCC 38TH ANNUAL REPORT, FIscAL YEAR 1972 (1973); 37TH ANNUAL
REPoRT, FiscAL YEAR 1971 (1972); 36TH ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1970 (1971). However, lax enforcement of the rules at least partly discouraged voluntary compliance. As
late as 1973 the Civil Rights Commission stated: "Although the FCC has taken a leadership role in this area and has required its regulatees to submit racial and ethnic data
and affirmative action plans, it does not strictly enforce its rules." REPORT-1973, supra
note 8, at 405.
117. In most cases, a petition to deny a license renewal was based on three separate
grounds: nonascertainment of community needs, deficient programming, and employ-

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:332

due to criticism resulting from its nonresponsiveness, the Commission, in
Time-Life Broadcast, Inc.," 8 issued the following clarification of the
basic requirements:
In order to challenge a station's equal employment program or
show noncompliance with the Commission's Rules, a petitioner
. . . must demonstrate with some degree of specificity that the
licensee's program in some way prevents equal employment opportunities or that the licensee discriminates in employment. The best
evidence of such discrimination or noncompliance would be specific examples of persons who were discriminated against by the
licensee because of race, religion, color, national origin, or sex." 9
Yet, when the Commission later was confronted with challenges based
in part on specific allegations of discrimination against a minority employee, 2 ' it retreated to the language of the original Report and Order,
stating that one instance of discrimination, even if substantial, did not
equal a pattern of discrimination, and thus did not warrant a hearing.'2 '
Former Commissioner Johnson dissented strongly from this position and
questioned whether such a rationale would result even in an evidentiary
hearing, much less a license denial. 22
As a result of two decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit, Stone v. FCC023 and Bilingual Bicultural Coalition of
ment discrimination. See, e.g., WGN of Colorado, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413 (1971);
Pueblo Stereo Broadcasting Corp., 32 F.C.C.2d 734 (1971). All grounds were considered individually and on separate evidence.
118. 33 F.C.C.2d 1050 (1972).
119. Id. at 1059.
120. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 770 (1972); RadiOhio, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d
721 (1972).
121. RadiOhio, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 721, 747 (1972). The Commission seemed to balance
the individual action against the licensee's efforts to comply with the regulations. See
also Taft Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 770, 799 (1972); Fort Collins Broadcasting Co.,
38 F.C.C.2d 707, 709 (1972).
122. [Alfter conceding that petitioners might well have, alleged sufficient facts
to indicate that WBNS-TV has, indeed, discriminated against at least one
black employee, the majority nevertheless refuses to designate that question
for hearing....
Passing the troublesome, and as yet unanswered, question
of just how many instances of discrimination are necessary before we have
a 'pattern,' if a petitioner must establish the existence of such a pattern in
order to obtain a hearing .. ., what purpose will be served by the hearing?
In short, the majority demands that in order to get a hearing, the petitioner
prove, prior to a hearing, that which can only be proved through a hearing.
RadiOhio, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 721, 750-51 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
123. 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'g Evening Star Broadcasting, 24 F.C.C.2d 735
(1970), rehearingdenied per curian, 466 F.2d 331 (1972).
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Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC,2 ' the Commission has become more receptive
to charges of employment discrimination. Both cases involved the role
to be accorded statistical information in establishing a prima facie showing of discriminatory practices necessary to obtain a hearing. In Stone,
the court sustained the Commission's holding that the statistical picture
presented did not establish a prima facie case. The court added, however,
that its ruling was not to be construed to mean that "statistical evidence
of an extremely low rate of minority employment will never constitute
a primafacie showing of discrimination, or 'a pattern of substantial failure
to accord equal employment opportunities'." 125 Citing Stone, the court
in Bilingual stated that the FCC had been neglecting the importance of
statistical disparities in employment data:
The Commission is aware that statistics alone do not provide ideal
evidence of discrimination. From Stone to the present case, it has
insisted that groups challenging license renewals show 'specific
instances of discrimination or a conscious policy of exclusion.'
This insistence is understandable, but unrealistic. Discrimination
may be a subtle process which leaves little evidence in its wake. 126
Although the court agreed that disproportionate employment figures
were inconclusive as to the lack of compliance, it did advise that the
importance of statistical data be recognized.
Certainly attributable in part to the Bilingual decision, the FCC developed a new perspective in 1974. Following a review of the 1971-72
annual employment reports, the Commission made inquiries concerning
the employment policies of 245 broadcast licensees located in 13 states,
2 territories, and the District of Columbia. 2 7 Although the FCC has

maintained the Position that proportionate equality is not required, but
rather that the proportion must fall within a zone of reasonableness, it
has stated: "Clearly ...if the number of employees of a particular minority group is low and the licensee has failed to take sufficient affirma124. 492 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'g Avco Broadcasting Corp., 39 F.C.C.2d 4 (1972).

125. 466 F.2d at 332 (dictum).
126. 492 F.2d at 659 (footnote omitted). The court held that the Commission had to
develop some procedures (in lieu of a hearing) through which challengers could have
discovery-like mechanisms to aid them in their attempts to prove a prima facie case.
127. FCC, FISCAL YEAR 1973 REPORT at 71 (1974). "The stations selected for review
had more than ten fulltime employees but no fulltime women employees or showed
a decline in their number. In areas with a minority population of 5 percent or more,
they employed no fulltime members of minority groups or showed a decline in their
number." Id.
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tive action efforts to remedy the situation, then a fair question is raised
requiring appropriate administrative action." 128
Notwithstanding the Commission's recognition of the value of statistical information, the FCC has accepted the presence of an affirmative
action program and a numerical increase in minority employment vis-avis the previous year's report as sufficient to prevail over inferences
drawn from statistical profiles in a number of recent cases. 1 9 The agency
has, however, been more considerate of employment discrimination
charges since Bilingual, as is evidenced by a number of cases in which a
license renewal has been temporary, conditional, or deferred subject to
further investigation of compliance. 3
Simply because the FCC has entered affirmatively the area of employment discrimination, arguably with some success, such action is not
necessarily appropriate for all other regulatory commissions. The argument that the FCC occupies a position somewhat unique within the
regulatory scheme by virtue of the qualities of the industry it is designed
to regulate, is more than colorable. Federal regulation of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum was the logical response to the chaos that
resulted from unrestricted access of individual station owners to the
limited number of available broadcast frequencies.3 1 Although it has
128. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 517, -- , 31 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 144,
152 (1974).
129. See, e.g., Avco Broadcasting Corp., 52 F.C.C.2d 825, 33 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 875
(1975); RKO General, Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 582, 33 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 632 (1975);
WTWV, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 1247, 33 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 65 (1975).
130. Scott Broadcasting Corp., 52 F.C.C.2d 1029, 33 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1065 (1975)
(employment policies deemed neutral at best, no blacks employed during 1967-72);
Louisiana TV Broadcasting Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 561, 33 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1568 (1975)
(renewal subject to filing of affirmative action program for next renewal period);
Triple X Broadcasting Co., 51 F.C.C.2d 585, 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1560 (1975)
(short term, conditional renewal; no blacks employed by station since 1972).
The FCC recently has released plans to clarify and modify its rules to assure that
licensees pursue active and affirmative equal employment programs. Among possible
changes are included active examination of each broadcaster's program and the imposition of remedial measures when a program is considered inadequate. "Such steps would
include a request for more specific data by race and sex on applicant flow, hires,
promotions and terminations, and the establishment of minority and/or female employment goals and timetables for each year of the license term." CCH EMp. Pac. GUIDE
No. 89, at 3 (August 9, 1975). These measures may well be in response to criticism
that the FCC still is failing in its enforcement duties. See UNITED STATES COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFnoRT-1974, VOL. 1, To
REGULATE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1974) [hereinafter cited as REPORT (1)-1974]. See

also CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE

5276.

131. For a discussion of the background and rationale of federal regulation of the
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been argued that the Commission's regulatory authority was intended
to be confined to the technical and economic considerations of the allocation and supervision of the use of such a limited national resource among
those best able to exploit the medium, 32 the Commission's role has been
expanded both statutorily" 3 and judicially. Noting that the statutory
mandate of the Federal Communications Act should be interpreted to
allow the FCC to respond with flexibility to the needs and effects of a
dynamic industry of exceptional public impact," 4 the Supreme Court
has stated that the Act "gave the Commission not niggardly but expansive
powers." "5 Consequently, it has been recognized that the public interest associated with broadcast regulation is "not susceptible of precise
or comprehensive definition;" "36 its constituent elements must necessarily be determined ad hoc."17 The public interest criteria, then,
has been extended beyond mere evaluation of the financial and technical
capabilities of station operators;"3 the agency has required surveys of the
informational and entertainment needs of local communities and their
identifiable socio-economic subgroups, 1 9 made value judgments on programming content, 140 considered the impact of the media on issues of
broadcast industry, see National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
132. See id. at 215-216. See generally Comment, Administrative Agencies, the Public
Interest, and National Policy: Is a Marriage Possible? 59 GEo. LJ. 420, 436-437 (1970).
133. The Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1970), which
created the FCC, states as its purpose, "among other things, to maintain the control of
the United States over all the channels of interstate and foreign radio transmission."
47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). The Act imposes upon the FCC the responsibility of carrying
out each of its various licensing and regulating duties and of determining whether
the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" will be served. See id. §§ 303, 307, 308,
309, 310(b), 312(a)(2), 316, 319(a).
134. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
135. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
136. McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 918 (1957).
137. Id.; Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
138. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1970); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470 (1940); Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
139. Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communication
of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Henry'v. FCC,
302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962); City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412 (1969).
140. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1940). See Note, The Public Interest in Balanced Progro
vning Content: The Case for FCC Regulation of Broadcasters' Format Changes,
40 GEo. VVAsH. L. REv. 933 (1972); Note, Regulation of Progrant Content by the FCC,
77 HARv. L. REv. 701 (1964).
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public health,' 4 ' and examined the right of the public itself to participate
in deciding what is the public interest. 4 2
Although it has been argued that with respect to consideration and enforcement of national social and economic policies the public interest
standard in broadcast regulation should not be limited,' 4 ' the Supreme
Court has stated that the FCC's discretion to determine what is in the
public interest is not without bounds. 44 In FCC v. RCA ConnnnZications, Inc., 14 5 for example, the Court held that the administrative grant
of a license based on the "national policy in favor of competition," 141
rather than on a finding that competition would have a beneficial impact
on the industry, was improper.147 RCA therefore suggests that in determining the scope of the FCC's public interest responsibilities, the existence of a broad national policy is only one factor to be considered. Any

agency action based on national policy must be related additionally to
the purpose for which the agency was created. 48 In examining specifically whether the FCC should scrutinize the employment practices of its
regulatees, it therefore must be asked, once it is accepted that agency inquiry is not limited to the purely technical and economic activities of the
industry regulatees, whether such regulation, besides conforming to a
national policy, is related sufficiently to agency goals. The requisite nexus
is found by noting that the affirmative regulation of employment practices by the FCC allows minority groups to participate in the vital industry function of informing the public and thereby molding public
opinion. This nexus places the FCC in a position substantially different
from other agencies with respect to employment practices and forms a
basis for affirmative regulation that may well be peculiar to that agency.
Although the above rationale appears to justify the FCC's regulation
of the employment practices of its broadcast licensees, it must be noted
that the Commission has extended such regulation to other regulatees as
141. Barghaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
142. See Volner, Broadcast Regulation: Is There Too Mluch "Ptblic" in the "Public
Interest"? 43 U. Cix. L. REV. 267 (1974).
143. See Comment, National Policy and the "Public Interest"-A Marriage of Necessity in the ConrnnnicationsAct of 1934, 114 U. P.%. L. Rr.%. 386 (1966).
144. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943);
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond &
Mortgage Co., 289 U,S. 266 (1933).

145.
146.
147.
148.

346 U.S. 86 (1953).
Id. at 89 (citing the Commission's prior opinion).
Id. at 94-95.
Cf. note 32 supra & accompanying text.
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well. 49 In outlawing employment discrimination in the telephone and
telegraph industries, the Commission stated:
The Communications Act of 1934 recognizes the special responsibilities of such carriers by providing that it is unlawful for any
common carrier to "make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities or
services for or in connection with like communication service .... "
It would seem evident that a company which follows discriminatory employment practices would find it difficult to provide nondiscriminatory service. Both because of the special position granted
communications common carriers by the Government, and the
relationship between service to the public and the carrier's employment practices, it would be intolerable to countenance discriminatory employment practices. 150
In so stating, the FCC adopted the broadest possible position on the
subject of employment discrimination, arguing that discriminatory employment practices certainly and unavoidably affect the service to the
public, thus taking the position specifically rejected in NAACP.
CONCLUSION

In analyzing the divergent positions of the FCC and the court in
NAACP it should be recognized that, with respect to the scope of an
agency's public interest responsibilities, both positions agree that administrative action must be reasonably related to administrative objectives as discerned from the agency's enabling statute. The positions differ
as to the evidence needed to show such a relationship. The FCC reasons
that a regulatee's employment discrimination necessarily affects service
and therefore must be regulated. Rejecting this absolutist approach, the
court in NAACP suggested that when the agency is confronted with a
"very poor equal employment opportunity record," it should presume
the existence of particular results that, unless rebutted by the regulatee,
may lead to administrative action.'
More specifically, the court stated
that the purpose of the FPC was to insure that its regulatees did not pass
along to the consumer unnecessary or illegitimate costs, and that when
confronted with evidence of clear employment discrimination, the
agency should assume that the burden of illegal costs was indeed borne
149. 34 Fed. Reg. 19200 (1969).
150. Id. at 19201.
151. 4 MB FED. PowER SERV. at 6-67.
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by consumers unless otherwise rebutted. 152 This "financial-impact test"
likewise is applicable to the SEC, ICC, and CAB, as these agencies were
created to regulate the economic problems confronting their licensees.
In examining the above approaches it should be remembered that al-

though greater agency involvement in discrimination matters appears
desirable, such involvement could lead to multiagency regulation of an
area already fraught with confusion. Recognizing the chaos presently

existing as a result of multiagency enforcement of civil rights legislation,
the United States Commission on Civil Rights recently has advocated
that such enforcement be headed by one agency. 153 Citing the diffusion
of enforcement authority as a prime reason for the overall failure of the
federal government effectively to eliminate employment discrimination,
the Commission reasoned that one agency, administering one standard
of compliance, would be more fair and efficient.154 As noted by one
152. Noted the court:
It is at least conceivable that a regulatee with a very poor equal employment
record might be presumed to have incurred excess labor costs because of
its exclusionary practices, and that these costs, being difficult to quantify and
prove, will be rebuttably presumed to equal a certain percentage of actual
labor costs.
Id. With regard to such indeterminate costs, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights has stated:
Employment discrimination gives rise to inefficiency. Excluding a group of
qualified p6tential applicants creates an artificial restriction on the labor
force which otherwise would be at the employer's disposal. This may tend
to inflate wages, limit the quality of work performance, and result in preventing the employer from realizing an optimum return on labor cost
expenditures.
Statement of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Before the Civil Aeronautics Board at 3-4 (September 25, 1972), reprinted in Brief for the Petitioners in
NAACP v. FPC at 33. See note 33 supra.
153. See UNrr STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, VOL. 5, DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT at 649-55 (1974).

154. Agencies have different policies and standards for compliance. They disagree, for example, on such key issues as the definition of employment discrimination, testing, the use of goals and timetables, fringe benefits, and back
pay. Moreover, there is inadequate sharing of information, almost no joint
setting of investigative or enforcement priorities, and little cross-fertilization
of ideas and strategies at the regional level. This fragmented administrative
picture has resulted in duplication of effort, inconsistent findings, and a
loss of public faith in the objectivity and efficiency of the program. This last
deficiency is best exemplified by contrasting the opinion of many employers that they are being harassed by Federal bureaucrats with the belief
of many minorities and women that the Government's equal employment
program is totally unreliable.
Id. at 618. The only steps taken thus far to comply with the Commission's recommenda-

1975]

REGULATORY COMMISSION AUTHORITY

commentator, the problems encountered with the present system lend
support to the recommendations of the Commission on Civil Rights:
To illustrate, a company may have an NLRB fair representation
case, a charge before the EEOC, a private action under Title VII,
a pattern and practice suit brought by the Attorney General, a
complaint to the OFCC and complaints to the procurement agencies, all involving the same set of facts. At each of these levels
precisely the same factual and legal issues may be litigated and
relitigated. It is obvious that the social objective of equal employment opportunity can easily become lost in this chaotic administrative situation. 155

Moreover, it is doubtful that the independent regulatory agencies have
either the manpower or the expertise to undertake the task of affirmative
regulation. Notably, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
has a tremendous backlog of cases.' 5 6 If a regulatory commission were
placed in a similar position without a massive infusion of funds and personnel, it is likely that other essential functions of the agency would
suffer.

For the above reasons it appears that the approach of the FCC may
be less desirable than that of the NAACP court. In practice, however,
the two approaches may not be as dissimilar as they first appear. The
court in NAACP noted that, under its financial-impact test, costs rebuttably presumed to exist might include, for instance, "excessive labor
costs incurred because of the elimination from the prospective labor
force of those who are discriminated against, [or] the costs of inefficiency
among minority employees demoralized by discriminatory barriers to
their fair treatment or promotion." 157 It seems clear that the presumption
tions were those of the Department of Labor in merging three of its contractor compliance units, including the OFCC, into a single "Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs." See Dep't of Labor News Release No. 75-333 (June 17, 1975), CCH EMP.
PRAc. GUIDE $ 5332 (1975).
155. Farmer, Equal Employment Opportunity-CaseStudy of Chaotic Administration,
44 FLA. B.J. 400 (1970). As an example of his proposition Farmer cites Crown Zellerbach
Corp. v. Wirtz, 281 F. Supp. 337 (D.D.C. 1969), in which the defendant had negotiated
a settlement acceptable to the EEOC only to be faced with litigation over the same
issue with both the OFCC and the Department of Justice.
156. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, the EEOC had a backlog of 38,254 cases.
EEOC 7th Annual Report, CCH LABOR LAW REPORTS, EMp. PRAc., No. 39, at 51 (August
23, 1973). By the end of the following year the backlog had risen to 57,286 cases.
EEOC 8th Annual Report, CCH LABOR LAW REPORTs, EMP. PRAc., No. 81, at 35 (April
10, 1975).
157. 4 MB FE.D. Powmt SEiv. at 6-66.
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of such nebulous costs would be, if not impossible, very difficult to
rebut. If the Commission were to consider the inability to rebut such
presumptions determinative as to whether a license should be granted,
such a result, in substance, would be no different than that obtained
under the FCC approach. The Commission, however, may mold the
NAACP financial-impact test into a more flexible solution by treating
the inability to rebut presumptions of unnecessary cost as but one factor
in many to consider when ruling upon a license application or renewal.
This approach is more desirable because it would direct the regulation
of employment discrimination toward those agencies more properly
disposed to performing that function.

